The Morality of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality

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1. Introduction

In The Morality of Law, Fuller introduces the distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, and applies it to problems of jurisprudence.1 In moral theory, both types of morality may be easily associated (though never completely identified) with major philosophical traditions such as utilitarianism and Kantianism on the one hand, and Aristotelianism on the other. While in the 1960s and 1970s the focus of moral philosophy was predominantly on duties and obligations, the recent neo-Aristotelian revival has led to renewed attention to concepts that belong to the sphere of aspiration, such as virtues and ideals. In legal theory, however, the sphere of aspiration has always been more marginal, as most jurists tend to focus on legal rules and duties. In my view, we should deplore this relative neglect because the idea of a morality of aspiration is very fruitful in legal theory and, as a result of developments in contemporary society, it is becoming even more relevant.

Although the basic idea of the distinction may be simple, we encounter a swamp of ambiguities when we try to elaborate it. What exactly is the relationship between the morality of aspiration and well-known notions such as principles and policies? Is Fuller’s metaphor of a continuum between aspiration and duty correct, or should we rather think of them as completely distinct categories or spheres? And how precisely should we apply the distinction to law and legal theory? One of the problems here is

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1 I want to thank David Luban, Bert van Roermund, Paul van Seters, Pauline Westerman, Kenneth Winston, and Willem Witteveen for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

1 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969; hereafter referred to as ML), p. 5, n. 2. Fuller argues that the basic idea is not novel, but his nomenclature is; and in my view, his application of this idea to the field of jurisprudence is original and highly inspiring.
that Fuller's arguments may be very inspiring and thought provoking, but they are not very precise.

The purpose of this article is to analyze and elaborate the morality of aspiration and its connections with the morality of duty, and to show how it can help us better understand law and construct better legal theories.

The article consists of three parts. Referring to the concrete example of professional role morality, I will first show how the distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration can help us understand law and morality. Next, I will engage in some conceptual clarification and analyze the notion of aspiration and its connection with related notions such as ideal, policy, and principle. The last step will be to connect this theoretical analysis with the debate on the functions and limits of law in modern society.

2. The practical importance of the distinction: Professional morality

There are many examples in law, ethics, and politics where the distinction between the two types of morality can be shown to be illuminating. An example in international law is Jackson's analysis of World Trade and the GATT. Jackson argues that there is a danger in mixing "norms of obligation" with "norms of aspiration" in the same instrument. According to Jackson, states have an obligation to fulfill their treaty agreements, but if treaties contain norms of aspiration, there may be the risk that states treat their strict obligations following from those treaties as mere aspirations.

Moreover, the distinction between morality of duty and morality of aspiration is central to our sociological understanding of normative phenomena. It is a central theme in the magnum opus of Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth. Time and again, Selznick stresses the importance to "distinguish what we can rely on from what we can aspire to." Some theorists who are inspired by Selznick and the tradition of American pragmatism have stressed the importance of aspiration in their work. Kenneth Winston has even gone so far as to defend that we cannot define law unless we recognize that it is (partly) oriented toward ideals. Similarly, one could argue that we cannot understand democracy unless we see that it is more than simply a set of rules and procedures and that it is oriented toward a democratic ideal.

A more elaborate discussion of one concrete theme, medical professional morality, may illustrate the importance of the distinction. The application of this distinction to professional morality is not original at all; Fuller used it in his own work on the ethics code of lawyers. My thesis is that we cannot fully understand a profession unless we acknowledge that it is not only characterized by minimum duties, but also by ideals and aspirations.

We cannot say what a good doctor is unless we refer both to elements of duty and to elements of aspiration. Some elements of professional morality can be formulated in codes and standards: in rules stating more or less strict duties, such as the duty to obtain a patient's informed consent before a treatment or experiment. But if we focus on these minimum rules only, we will get a very poor image of what a good doctor is. A good doctor aspires to achieve more: she strives toward excellence beyond the minimum. This "more," however, is greatly dependent on context and on the personalities of both doctor and patient and, therefore, cannot be formulated in general rules. Some doctors will seek excellence by devoting most of their attention to methods of effective treatment for breast cancer; others will strive to be warm, supportive, and caring persons taking much time for their patients. There may be one general ideal of the good doctor, but the way in which this ideal is interpreted and implemented in medical practice is varied and diverse.

The idea that it is characteristic of professions to be partly oriented toward ideals suggests interesting explanations for some phenomena.

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3 Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992), p. 38. There may be a parallel or mutual influence here rather than a one-way influence from Fuller on Selznick because the distinction can already be found in Selznick's early work.

6 Wibren van der Burg, Het democratisch perspectief: Een verkenning van de normatieve grondslagen der democratie (The democratic point of view: An exploration of the normative basis of democracy) (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1991).
7 See Luban's contribution in this volume.
Firstly, it offers an explanation for some characteristics of professions. Davis and Elliston argue that three empirical characteristics of a profession are that there is a commitment to the social good, that it is based on special skills and knowledge, and that it usually has a certain autonomy and self-regulation. The connection between these three characteristics becomes clearer once we understand that professions are not oriented toward one simple social good that allows an instrumentalist, let alone mechanic, conception of ends and means. The various aspects of the social good that professions aim to realize are very complex ones, which we can never describe or realize completely, like good health care or the rule of law. There are various ways to make these complex ideals more concrete and to try to realize them as much as possible. Professional autonomy allows professionals to choose how, using their specialized skills and knowledge, they can make the best of these ideals in each concrete situation. The ideal orientation thus makes a coherent sense of the empirical characteristics.

A second phenomenon which we can understand better if we see that a profession is ideal oriented is the common complaint of professionals that external circumstances (lack of time, financial and material resources, too heavy a workload) make it impossible for them to practice the “art” of the profession. It is inherent in professional practice that every professional sometimes feels frustrated and perhaps even guilty about the fact that she should have given more care to a patient, should have spent more time on literature research for a paper, and so on. In a sense, professionals can never say that they have finished their work, and they always meet limitations. In comparison with the ideal, they will always fail somehow. Of course, the feelings of frustration should be taken seriously, and external causes may be an important factor in this. Yet, every professional should understand that even if budgets were higher or the workload less heavy, she would still encounter similar problems because this is part and parcel of being a professional.

A professional morality should not only consist of a morality of aspiration but also of a morality of duty. The two should be balanced: “In the theory of social ordering . . . we should identify both what we can aspire to and what we must guard against.” Here, Fuller’s metaphor of locating the pointer at the proper resting place on the scale between aspiration and duty is illuminating. Fuller argues that the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty are not strictly distinct, but rather belong on a continuum. If someone’s professional morality is too idealistic and the morality of duty is underdeveloped, the risk may be that she too easily violates essential minimum norms. A doctor devoted to finding a cure for cancer might thus sacrifice the interests and even the lives of individual patients. On the other hand, a doctor who only sticks to the minimum rules and protocols may miss the flexibility to give each patient what he really needs.

When we want to draft legislation on medical professional morality, the image of the pointer is helpful. The aspirational part of professional morality is usually better left to professional autonomy; we should not try to formulate strict legal rules for it. The morality of duty better lends itself to legal regulation, to what Fuller has called the enterprise of “subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.”

It is important to find the right place, beyond which further regulation is useless or even counterproductive. If the pointer is too low on the scale (which means that we formulate too few standards and rules for the medical profession), this may lead to serious neglect of some of the patient’s interests, just because the doctor sacrifices them to some higher aspiration such as the progress of medical science. The recent increasing role of health law in most Western countries can be seen as a reaction to a situation in which the pointer was too low: the legal regulation of medical practice was insufficient and patients’ rights were almost nonexistent. If, on the other hand, the pointer is placed too high, the doctor will feel handicapped and frustrated by strict regulations and protocols that prevent him from giving the best treatment in each case, with its particular characteristics and context. Such a process of putting the pointer higher by introducing new regulations may, however, easily go too far, so that regulation distorts the sphere of aspiration. It seems to me that the Dutch fear of “American circumstances” in health care is partly related to the fact that the pointer in American health law is now placed too high.

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12 "A morality of aspiration is not easily captured or readily cabined by rules and systems." Selznick, "Moral Commonwealh, p. 260.
14 "If the pointer is set too high, the rigidities of duty may reach up to smother the urge toward excellence and substitute for truly effective action a routine of obligatory acts." (ML, p. 170.)
with the result that doctors – in fear of being sued for violating patients’ rights – have to practice bureaucratic and defensive medicine.

The Dutch Medical Treatment Contracts Act (Wet geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst) partly acknowledged this double nature of the profession by formulating both a number of strict rules and a general aspiration, the care of a good caregiver (de zorg van een goed hulpverlener). The latter implies that more than the minimum should be done and that this cannot be adequately formulated in strict legal rules; yet, this aspiration should be taken seriously as a point of orientation for medical practice and health law. Seen from this perspective, however, we should deplore the amendment added in the final phase of the parliamentary debate, stating that this general norm should be interpreted with reference to the professional standard. The result of this amendment is that what seemed to constitute a framework of aspiration is reduced to a norm of duty.

3. The morality of aspiration

It is now time to move to a more theoretical level. We should start by taking a closer look at what Fuller says on the morality of aspiration. He has a remarkably indirect way of describing this concept, for instance, through a comparison with aesthetics or economics, by illustrating it with concrete examples, or by contrasting it with the morality of duty. But a clear and direct description, let alone a definition, is lacking. This may be an indication that it is a concept that, though intuitively clear, is hard to define.

According to Fuller, it is the “morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers.”18 Partly quoting Adam Smith, he argues: “Like the principles of a morality of aspiration, the principles of good writing, ‘are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions of acquiring it.”19 In the light of this vagueness it is not surprising that a subjectivism is “appropriate to the higher reaches of human aspiration.”20 “It is said that the morality of aspiration implies some conception of the highest good of man, though it fails to tell us what this is.”21 Finally, “experiment, inspiration, and spontaneity” flourish in the sphere of aspiration.22

These quotations suffice to present an intuitive grasp of the morality of aspiration, yet they provoke more questions than they answer. The morality of aspiration differs in many qualitative respects from the morality of duty, but Fuller suggests that there is a continuum between the two moralities: How is this possible? How can the distinction between the two moralities be connected to common legal (or moral) standards like principles and policies, rules and virtues? And, finally, how can something as vague and indeterminate as the morality of aspiration help us in dealing with concrete problems?

To answer these questions, I will focus on moral theory in this section, and only at the end will I briefly illustrate how an analogous analysis is possible for law. In ethical theory, we can easily find various examples of positions that resemble Fuller’s morality of aspiration, such as neo-Aristotelianism. But as soon as we perceive the analogy between neo-Aristotelianism and the morality of aspiration on the one hand, and rule-based ethical theories and the morality of duty on the other, the problem of the continuum becomes even more vividly clear. Should we regard the differences between, to mention just two authors, Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Gert as merely resulting from a focus on different spheres within one continuum?23 Is there a higher harmony embracing the two?

Before concluding, however, that Fuller must have been mistaken in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, we should try to find an interpretation that upholds the idea of a continuum; not only because we should avoid unfair criticism, but also because the idea of such a continuum is intuitively appealing and fits the way we look at our own morality. Usually, we have a broad variety of moral reasons, reaching from the strictest obligations to lofty aspirations. Near the bottom we find rules such as “Do not kill your neighbor”; on the highest level there are vague and open ideals such as “the just society” or “the good life.” The idea of the two moralities does greater justice to this variation than approaches that try to reduce moral experience to one basic category such as principles or rules, or that suggest one fundamental law or principle as the foundation of all morality.

15 ML, p. 5.
16 ML, p. 6.
17 ML, p. 13.
18 ML, p. 17.
19 ML, p. 28.
If we go upward along the continuum, our moral reasons become weaker in three ways: their obligatory force decreases, they become vaguer and more ambiguous, and (as a corollary of the latter) their interpretation becomes more subjective. Of some reasons we can clearly say to which part of the scale they belong. Prohibitions against killing and stealing are minimum ones, whereas perfectionist ideals such as “the good life” belong to the sphere of aspiration. But there is a large gray zone in between, which is best exemplified by the norm that we should give money to the poor. We certainly have good moral reasons to do so, but they have less force than the prohibition against killing. Moreover, it is more vague and indeterminate (How much exactly should we give?), and it is also open to subjective interpretation (Shall I give the money to the beggar on the corner of the street or shall I use an intermediary, such as a religious charity?). It is also subjective in the sense that the interpretation and force depend on the subjective circumstances of the actor: his personal income, his view of life, or other obligations he tries to honor.

The gray zone between the two spheres need not be the domain of arbitrariness. When we better understand the nature of the two spheres and their elements, we can perhaps find good grounds to determine where to set the pointer that divides the two spheres – if not at specific points, then at least within a more restricted range. In order to do so, we must “map” the two spheres in more detail, look for characteristic elements, and analyze the connections between them. Fuller is of little help in this respect; he gives only a few hints about how to make such a map. Therefore, any attempt to map and structure the morality of aspiration cannot claim to be a mere interpretation of Fuller’s thought. Below I will develop a constructive theory of how to fill in the two spheres in more detail, in order to make Fuller’s idea of the two moralities work in practice. In the course of doing so, I will have to go beyond Fuller in some respects; nevertheless I claim that this critical reconstruction is still basically loyal to Fuller’s most important ideas.

A first attempt to structure the broad sphere of aspiration is to introduce a distinction between three categories within that sphere: principles, policies, and ideals. As a definition for ideals I suggest:

Ideals are values that are implicit or latent in the law, or the public and moral culture of a society or group, which usually cannot be fully realized and which partly transcend contingent, historical formulations and implementations in terms of rules, principles, and policies.

Ideals are, thus, quite vague, indeterminate, and ambiguous.

Principles and policies, on the other hand, are more determinate in content and less vague, though still much less determinate and precise than rules formulating duties. The distinction between policy and principle is a familiar one in the early work of Ronald Dworkin. To put it in simple terms: A principle is a direct norm for action, such as “do this or do not do that.” A policy is a pursuit of certain goals and thus sets an indirect standard for action; there may be many ways to reach these goals.

Examples of ideals are respect for autonomy and economic prosperity. An example of a principle is: “Patients should give their full informed consent to each medical treatment.” This is a principle and not a rule, because there may be circumstances in which it is impossible or undesirable to conform to the principle. An example of a policy is: “Try to realize maximum efficiency in the treatment of patients.” Clearly, both this principle and this policy cannot be fully realized now – if only because they often conflict – but both can be good grounds for more specific rules and offer a normative framework for making concrete decisions.

Ideals, principles, and policies are connected. Ideals can be transformed, in two steps, into more specific action guides such as principles and policies and, then again, one further step is needed to transform these into rules. The first step is from concept to conception. The concept of justice can be made more concrete and less ambiguous if we interpret it to mean, for instance, that everyone should have sufficient means to live a decent life. It is one only of the possible interpretations of the ideal of justice as such. The step from concept to conception involves an unavoidable choice; the choice is unavoidable because otherwise we cannot connect

21 I elaborated the concept of ideals in Wibren van der Burg, “The Importance of Ideals,” Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1997): 23-37, at p. 25 ff. My definition here is slightly different because I explicitly mention “policies,” whereas in my earlier definition I used Dworkin’s broader concept of principles, which includes both principles in a narrower sense and policies.

22 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 22. Dworkin distinguishes between arguments of principle and arguments of policy. Here I suggest a slightly different view of a principle than Dworkin; in my opinion, a principle need not be connected with individual rights. This view fits in better with Dworkin’s more recent work.

the ideal with concrete action guides and it will remain a vague Utopia. Yet this choice does not imply that other conceptions cannot be valid. Because an ideal transcends every attempt to grasp it in formulations, we must accept that other attempts to formulate it, i.e. other conceptions, can be valid interpretations as well.

A second step is to go from this, still highly abstract, conception of the ideal to less abstract principles and policies. One approach is based on the idea that, as much as possible, we ought to realize the ideal here and now. The result of such a deontological approach is a principle. For example, if someone is in material need, give her the money she needs. Such a principle still belongs to the sphere of aspiration because it is impossible to act accordingly all the time. We can also take a different, teleological approach. Rather than focusing on the here and now, we can see the ideal as a goal, as a just society toward which we should try to move. The result of such an approach is a policy. We must direct our efforts so that we will help to bring that future just society nearer; for instance, by supporting political parties that promise reforms or by giving money to organizations that support structural improvements in Third World countries. This policy is part of the sphere of aspiration because it sets a limitless task – we will never have done enough to reach the goal; there is always more that can be done.

Both principles and policies usually cannot be fully realized. They are different ways of interpreting and implementing the more fundamental ideal and of trying to realize that ideal partly, in actions here and now, or in future states of affairs, respectively. This means that principle and policy still belong to the sphere of aspiration; they are not clear duties. But they can give rise to duties and concrete rules in various ways.

A further step of transformation downward brings us to the field of the morality of duty. For example, I can specify the principle that I should help the poor by making it a rule to give 10 percent of my income to (organizations that aid) the poor. This means that my moral rule is principle based. In an analogous way, I can also specify a policy, for example by making it a rule that I will always give 10 percent of my income to organizations that support structural reforms in Third World countries.

A final step of transformation would be that of concrete decision-making. On the basis of my rule to give 10 percent of my income to certain organizations, I can decide to give 500 guilders to a specific religious charity and 1,000 guilders to a different charity, and so on. Concrete decisions need not always be rule based; they can also be based on princi-
between ideals, principles, policies, rules, and concrete decisions. As a theoretical exposition would largely be a repetition of the above, I will illustrate this with an example. One of the leading legal ideals in Western culture is the ideal of respect for the autonomous person. This is a very broad ideal, which can give rise to many more specific norms. A more concrete way to formulate a part of the ideal is to say that we should protect and enhance autonomous decision-making with respect to medical treatment. A deontological interpretation of this ideal might lead to a principle holding that the patient’s informed consent should be obtained before performing any treatment. A teleological interpretation of the ideal might lead to policies that foster conditions for autonomous decision-making such as easy access to information and counseling services. Both could give rise to concrete rules. A principle-based rule would be that a doctor must always obtain the informed consent from her patient, unless the patient is unconscious or there is some other kind of emergency. A policy-based rule would be that every hospital must have leaflets available containing information about common diseases and treatments, in every language that is frequently spoken in the hospital’s area.

4. Law: The protective and the instrumental functions

Fuller’s theory can be put to practical use in many themes. One of the most interesting themes, which would have fitted nicely into Fuller’s larger, unfinished project of a grand theory of “economics,” is that of the functions and limits of law in modern society. I think that the distinction between the two moralities is especially illuminating here, because each of the two spheres is connected with specific functions of law. To see which functions are involved, it may be helpful to consider briefly two authors who also connected this distinction with the functions of law, but who, in my opinion, took the wrong track.

Kamiel Mortelmans and, particularly, Willem Salet apply Fuller’s theory very straightforwardly to the debate on instrumental legislation in the modern interventionist state. They identify aspirations with pur poses and policy goals, and regard the morality of aspiration as the basis for instrumental legislation. The morality of duty is connected with more traditional forms of law, such as criminal law, which formulate citizens’ rights and duties. This is the sphere in which the protective function of autonomous law is dominant. Consequently, Fuller’s metaphor of the pointer seems to lead to a simple conclusion. The modern interventionist state has gone too far with legislation as an instrument for public policy because it has tried to legislate on the basis of a morality of aspiration, whereas Fuller argued that a morality of aspiration is not a good basis for regulation. The solution Mortelmans and Salet suggest is obvious: We should return to the core business of law, the sphere of the morality of duty, which is connected with the protective function. We should have less instrumental legislation in order to move the pointer to a lower point on the scale between aspiration and duty.

This position should be rejected for various reasons. Firstly, because it offers a reductionist and highly distorted conception of the morality of aspiration. Aspirations are reduced to simple policy goals and lose their moral character. But this is something completely different from the way in which Fuller describes the morality of aspiration and connects it with the idea of excellence, of the Good Life, with the broad ideals of legality and democracy – in fact, it is no morality at all. Secondly, this flawed reading of Fuller makes no sense of the idea behind the pointer. Willem Salet suggests that the basic idea is that of a distinction between moral principles and policy purposes – which is clearly not Fuller’s idea. Moreover, Salet gives no good arguments why we should make such a strong demarcation. If this were really the idea behind the pointer, it would be of political, and legal relations] (s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1994).

28 Mortelmans, Orden en sturen beleid, p. 1, n. 2, regards the morality of duty as the equivalent of Ordnungspolitik or, in Dutch, ordenend beleid (regulating policy) and the morality of aspiration as the equivalent of Ablaufspolitik or, in Dutch, sturen beleid (goal-oriented policy).

29 Thus, Salet, On recht en staat, p. 18, argues that Fuller “was of the opinion that the overwhelming growth in aspirational legislation is inconsistent with the classic legal principles that focus on rights and duties” (my translation). However, he does not refer to any passage in Fuller’s work where such a suggestion can be found.

30 Salet even seems to suggest that only the sphere of duty may be seen as morality proper, and that the morality of aspiration has a political and economic character (Salet, On recht en staat, p. 39). This can most clearly be seen in the way Salet sets the two spheres against each other as that of the beginseloude principes van waarden en normes (literally: principled principles of values and norms – it seems that he tries to combine all words with a moral connotation in one phrase) and that of de doelgerichte beleidaspripties (purposive policy aspirations; Salet, On recht en staat, p. 135).
little help because no one can seriously defend that all statutes motivated by policy considerations should be banned. So we would still need a second pointer, demarcating within the sphere of “aspiration” that part of policy-based law which is acceptable and that part of policy-based law which is not.

I think that the idea of the pointer in Fuller’s theory is a different one. It is rather that moral aspirations cannot be caught in strict rules and duties, because that would stifle creativity and allow too little space for legitimate plurality. The way in which a morality of aspiration should be realized depends on the context and on the subject, and is in that sense subjective and indeterminate. But this does not mean that aspirations are not moral, and that there is no role for law at all in the sphere of aspiration.

Salel’s interpretation of Fuller’s theory may be faulty, but it is an interpretation that arises quite easily. If one wants to connect the morality of aspiration with a specific function of law, the idea of associating it with instrumental legislation that explicitly aims to realize certain goals and aspirations, arises quite naturally. It is therefore necessary to analyze where the two standard functions of law fit into this scheme before we try to develop a theory about any other functions which fit into each of the two moralities as such.

A different approach to the two functions may start from the distinction between principles and policies discussed in the previous section. The protective function of law is dominant when law aims to realize certain ideals here and now. When we discuss the protective function of law, we therefore speak of principles, and principle-based rules and rights. The instrumental function of law is dominant when law is used to realize certain goals in the future, through policies and policy-based rules. Thus, instrumentality and protection are not two separate spheres but rather correspond with different types of argument. Protection and instrumentality should be seen as two dimensions that permeate morality and law from the most basic duties up to the highest aspirations. These functions attach both to the very simple rules at the level of theft and tax laws and to the more abstract levels of human rights and long-term environmental goals.

31 Cf. ML, p. 12.

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The problem of too much regulation is not specific to the instrumental function of law, although this has recently drawn most attention in theoretical debates. In the case of rules connected with the protective function of law, we may find similar problems in that sometimes regulation has gone too far, has stifled creativity and spontaneity, and has blocked due attention to context-specific and subjective fine-tuning. Mary Ann Glendon’s book Rights Talk contains many examples of which we could say that law has gone too far in regulating on the basis of arguments of principle and in structuring the legal debate in terms of rights. Recent criticism of labor regulations has been that too strict regulations protecting workers’ rights have frustrated flexibility and productivity. In other words, the criticism was that the pointer between aspiration and duty was placed too high; less regulation was desirable to move the pointer to a lower place.

The controversy about the role and limits of law in modern society does not turn on the question whether or not certain statutes are instrumentally motivated and are therefore categorically unacceptable. It rather turns on the issue whether what is required from the citizen is a reasonable demand; the criticism of modern “over”regulation is that the pointer demarcating the sphere of legal duty is set too high. This can be illustrated with two examples, one concerning instrumental legislation and the other concerning the legislation protecting patients’ rights.

The purpose of protecting nature against pollution caused by too much animal manure is not controversial, nor is the fact that we use legislation as a means for this purpose. Criticism on environmental legislation rather focuses on questions such as whether we can reasonably require that farmers conform to a great number of expensive and complex rules, whether this is an effective way of influencing human conduct, and so on. In other words, it is not legislation as such, but the precise content of the law that is at stake. The suggestion is that law has crossed its boundaries by implementing a legitimate purpose through a too detailed and burdensome system of rules. Here, so the criticism goes, the pointer is set too high, which results in even adverse reactions from farmers. Perhaps, if we had fewer rules (and especially less detailed and complex ones), they would be willing not only to follow these rules but also to cooperate voluntarily toward the common purpose of preventing pollution.

In that part of the law where the protective function is dominant,

32 This is the core of truth in Dworkin’s initial identification of principles and rights; most principles are indeed connected with rights. Some principles, however, like those of good governance or the rule of law, are primarily meant to protect the integrity of law and state, without directly being connected with individual rights.

similar discussions can be found with respect to the protection of patients' rights. The recognition of patients' rights is clearly a matter of principle. To a certain extent, we can formulate them as rules, as strict rights, but beyond a certain point, we may go too far, which may be counterproductive. Many health-care professionals claim that legislation aimed at protecting patients' rights has indeed gone too far. In the Netherlands, even patients' organizations now admit that strict regulations stating that only if psychiatric patients constitute a real danger to themselves or to others is it legally permitted to give them involuntary treatment, frustrate the good care for some categories of schizophrenic patients. Legal recognition of patients' rights with the purpose of protecting patients might lead to more defensive and bureaucratic medicine, and would thus, in the end, go against patients' interests. In order to prevent this, we should have less strict regulation and we should place more trust in the professional autonomy of health-care professionals. I do not want to go into the details of the discussion here; I only want to show that the discussion can be seen as one about the place of the pointer as a criterion of demarcation between strict regulation and forms of law that leave more room for flexibility and variation.

The debate on the role and limits of law is, of course, much broader than merely a debate on the demarcation between the strict rules of the morality of duty and the general principles and policies of the morality of aspiration. In Fuller's theory, we can find inspiration for another approach that I will only mention here. It is debatable whether some forms of instrumental regulation are to be regarded as law, or rather are a mixture of "law" and a different mechanism of social order, namely "managerial direction." One possible criticism of instrumental legislation is that, though it uses the means of law, it is also partly a form of managerial direction. A basis for critical analysis of this phenomenon can then be found in the idea that each mechanism of social ordering has its own internal morality, and that if instrumental legislation is indeed a mixture of both, this may lead both to overlap and to tensions between the internal moralities of both mechanisms. Some forms of instrumental legislation obviously conflict with the internal morality of law as sketched by Fuller in the eight principles of legality. These eight principles and analogous principles of the internal morality of managerial direction can then be used as criteria for the evaluation of instrumental legislation. For exam-

ple, one of the problems of instrumental legislation is that it has to be changed too frequently, to adapt it to changing circumstances, which conflicts with Fuller's criterion of constancy over time.36

5. Law: The communicative and the regulatory functions

The conclusion is that the protective and instrumental functions of law can be seen as two dimensions that permeate morality and law in the spheres of both duty and aspiration. The question remains whether there are also functions of law typically connected with the morality of duty and with the morality of aspiration.

The function of law that is typically connected with the morality of duty is the most obvious one. It is what is usually called the regulative function, the regulation of human behavior. In fact, only for that part of law that is connected with the morality of duty can we say that it is the "enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules."37 Fuller uses this formulation as a general description of law but I think that this, if taken literally, is too restricted a view of what law is. It certainly is an important part of law, and the part to which we are most accustomed, but it is not all there is to law. Highlighting the defects of this formulation may help us see which other function is neglected if one concentrates only on the regulatory function.

It should be noted that Fuller himself has a much broader perspective than his formulation suggests. His formulation is helpful in highlighting the differences with a positivist stance, but it is certainly too restricted if perceived as shorthand for Fuller's own interactional perspective on law. The criticism of this formulation that I will present below is therefore one to which, in my view, Fuller might have consented.

Fuller's formulation of what law is, is too restricted. There are other ways in which law can govern human conduct than by subjecting it to rules. Law may offer general points of orientation, ideals, principles, and policies without determining precisely how they are to be interpreted and implemented. Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues that law should not be seen as merely a system of rules, and illustrates this with standards like

34 For a more extensive discussion, see Van der Burg, "Bioethics and Law."
35 Cf. his discussion in ML, p. 209 ff.
36 This second line of thought can also be found in Mortelmans, Invoel van het Europees gemeenschapsrecht. It leads to interesting criticisms and recommendations; cf. Mortelmans, Invoel van het Europees gemeenschapsrecht, p. 589 ff.
37 ML, passim.
principles and policies.\textsuperscript{38} Philip Selznick stresses the importance of ideals and implicit values.\textsuperscript{39} Law can authoritatively lay down these standards of aspiration as action guides and points of orientation for citizens.\textsuperscript{40} Legislation communicates those standards—values or ideals, principles, and policies—to the members of society, expecting that they will accept them as guidelines. We can call this the communicative function of law: it provides a common point of orientation for citizens, and sets a common normative framework for moral discourse.\textsuperscript{41}

This communicative function is most clearly at home (though not exclusively) within the sphere of aspiration. If legislation tries to formulate some ideals, or principles and policies directly, then the communicative function is central. In the legal norm of the “care of a good caregiver,” in the preambles of many statutes and, particularly, treaties, we find formulations that can be seen as formulations of ideals. Laying down principles or policies at a less abstract level can also communicate to the citizens or other norm subjects that they are expected to be guided by those principles and policies. The formulation of basic values in a statute can therefore be a good legislative strategy, for example in legislation concerning embryo research.\textsuperscript{42}

The communicative function is the least prominent function of legislation, and only seldom is it the most dominant function of a statute. It is especially important for those issues which have a strong moral dimension to it. Examples are constitutions or laws on bioethical issues, such as abortion and euthanasia. Usually a statutory text has various functions at the same time, which support each other. A good example is the constitutional freedom of expression (article 7 of the Dutch Constitution). The protective function, guaranteeing a fundamental right of citizens, is central, but is only effective because the text also has a regulatory character, creating clear rights and correlating duties. We may also regard this article as having an instrumental function because a free public debate and a free press facilitate the functioning of a lively democracy. It also has a communicative function, because it formulates fundamental values as points of orientation for both citizens and public institutions.

Let us return to Fuller’s two moralities. The connection of the two functions with the two spheres is a matter of degree, just like the distinction between the two moralities is a matter of degree. Going up the scale from duty to aspiration, our standards become more abstract, vaguer, and less binding. If we want to regulate human conduct, it is necessary that we set concrete, unambiguous rules that have a strong obligatory character. Traffic rules such as the obligation to drive one’s car on the right-hand side of the road, would not be very effective if they needed much interpretation, were vague, and if we could not trust others to act accordingly. For such rules, the regulatory function is dominant, and this requires that rules are clear, concrete, and binding; in other words, that they meet Fuller’s eight criteria of legality. Even here, however, the communicative function is never completely absent.

The farther we go up along the scale—legal standards becoming more abstract, ambiguous, and vague, and becoming less obligatory in character—the less these standards are apt to perform a regulatory function, and the more we need to reflect on them. Standards like the ideal of democracy or the principle of free speech are highly important for law, but they do not directly and unambiguously determine human conduct in the way traffic rules do. There is a legitimate plurality of interpretations. In order to avoid pure subjectivity in the sense of arbitrariness in that interpretation, discussion with others is essential. The communication involved is thus not only that between the legislature and the citizen, but also among citizens themselves.

Going up along the scale is not merely a deplorable weakening of standards. I suppose that many lawyers still tend to think of principles (let alone ideals) as rules maanqué. As long as we look at them in this way, the communicative function can only be a defective function.\textsuperscript{43} Then

\textsuperscript{38} Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, chapters 2 and 3.
\textsuperscript{40} At various places, Fuller explicitly acknowledges the importance of these standards, but it seems to me that this acknowledgment can be found throughout the book, with its stress on purpose, aims, ideals, and so on.
\textsuperscript{41} A second line of criticism on Fuller’s formulation of what law is, is that it neglects the interactive process through which law comes into existence. If we take this into account, we might focus on a fifth function, the expressive function: Law expresses that certain standards are important to the political community. I have discussed this function in Wibren van der Burg, "Legislation on Human Embryos: From Status Theories to Value Theories," Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 82 (1996): 73-87.
\textsuperscript{42} A discussion here would take us too far from my main line of argument. If we take the expressive and communicative functions—which are strongly connected—under one heading, we might call them the symbolic function; cf. W.J. Wittenbeeck, P. van Seters, and G. van Roermund, Wat maakt de wet symbolisch? (Symbolic laws?)(Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1991).
\textsuperscript{43} Van der Burg, "Legislation on Human Embryos."

\textsuperscript{43} This has usually been the attitude toward so-called symbolic legislation, as merely an ineffective form of legislation.
there will always be a tendency to transform principles and ideals to rules, because rules are simply considered to be the perfect type of legal standard.

A more positive approach to the morality of aspiration and the communicative function is, however, possible. For some categories of simple situations we can easily frame general rules. But there are many situations for which such simple rules are not possible or not desirable. If we tried to frame simple rules, we would oversimplify the situations and the rules would be inadequate. This is, for example, the case in dynamic and variable situations that demand flexibility or that are characterized by a broad variation in relevant parameters. In such situations, regulation will often not work, yet some form of normative guidance may be desirable. Saying that we cannot grasp the complexities of medical practice in simple rules does not imply that the law has no business in the way in which doctors perform their tasks. We simply have to look at different ways to influence and control their behavior.

Standards of aspiration may be the solution for such situations, but only if they are combined with a different attitude than the attitude usually taken toward rules. If legal rules are well framed, all we need to expect from citizens is rule conformity. There is no need for them to reflect on the content or purpose of the rule as long as they consider the rule an authoritative action guide. A similar attitude toward ideals or principles is inadequate. Guidance by ideals, principles, and policies requires that citizens internalize these standards and try to realize them as well as they can. They must try to understand what the point is of these standards, what their implications are for different situations, and even how they should be adapted to respond to new exigencies. They have to take part in a process of constructive interpretation, together with those who framed these standards and together with their fellow citizens who also try to live up to those standards. To do so, we need to reflect on them and to discuss them with others. If reflection and discussion are lacking, the standards will become ossified, and the necessary dynamics and flexibility of the legal system will give way to a rigid and static system which will soon be out of touch with reality.

It may seem that I am now completely out of touch with Fuller. I admit that, in my attempt to construct a coherent theory about the two moralities, I have introduced various ideas and distinctions that have no explicit basis in The Morality of Law, and in this respect I have gone beyond this work. But at this point, we can return to his work to give one of his ideas the central place it deserves. I have always been puzzled by the last pages of The Morality of Law, where Fuller suggests one central, indisputable principle of what may be called substantive natural law: "Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire." Fuller argues that it is this principle that supports and infuses all human aspiration, but "speaks with the imperious voice we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty." Clearly, it is an important insight, to be found in authors as different as Wittgenstein and Habermas, yet it somehow did not seem to fit into Fuller's theory. Moreover, the argument Fuller presents is extremely brief and unconvincing, occupying barely more than one page. It almost looks like an isolated confession of faith.

I will leave aside the foundations of the principle in social theory and anthropology. The important point is that we can now see that it should indeed have a central place in a theory of law, more precisely in that part of law which is connected with the sphere of aspiration. Without open channels of communication, law in this sphere is ineffective. Law can only fulfill its communicative function if communication is possible. Once we understand this point, Fuller's principle of substantive natural law is no longer a curiosity. It is a principle which is essential for an effective functioning of law in the sphere of aspiration.

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44 Cf. Fuller's repeated emphasis on experiment, inspiration, and spontaneity as characteristic of the sphere of aspiration.

45 I submit, however, that I remain fully loyal to the spirit of his project of an interactional view of law. Moreover, in other works by Fuller, especially those brought together in The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller (ed. K.I. Winston, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1981), we can find more explicit support for some of the ideas suggested here; however, I will limit myself here to The Morality of Law.

46 ML, p. 186. I suppose I am not the only one who was puzzled by this principle; it is an element in Fuller's theory to which references in the literature are scarce and which is often even omitted in summaries of his theory. For instance, in the seven pages Harris devotes to The Morality of Law, it is completely neglected (J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophy, London: Butterworths, 1980).

47 ML, p. 186. In a more trivial sense, it is essential for regulatory law as well, if only because rules have to be conveyed to citizens through some form of communication and because law will ossify and become dysfunctional in the long run if it is never made the object of critical reflection and discussion.
6. Conclusion: The role and limits of law in modern society

I think the distinction between the four functions of law may bring more sophistication into the debate on the role and limits of law. As such, it does not offer direct solutions, but rather a better way of structuring the problems. So far, the debate has predominantly been focused on instrumental regulation, and this bias should be corrected. The important thing is to understand which functions of law can help us to deal with a certain problem area; usually it is not only one function: we should try to establish a balanced combination.49 This means that we should carefully consider which combination of functions and, thus, which types of law and which attitudes toward law we need in order to deal adequately with a problem or field. From this perspective, we have a framework both for a critical evaluation of existing law and for constructive guidance in new legislation projects. None of the functions should dominate the others, and we must thus find a balance in two dimensions.

1. There should be a balance between the protective and the instrumental functions, between principle and policy. Law can err both ways. The dominance of an instrumentalist attitude toward law (and particularly criminal law) can easily lead to an erosion of traditional constitutional freedoms. The most ardent defender of the protective function of law, Ronald Dworkin, makes a good point when arguing in Taking Rights Seriously that rights present trumps over mere policy arguments. Here the metaphor of balance can even be misleading, because it suggests that policy arguments and rights can be balanced on one simple scale.

Law can also go too far in stressing the protective function, thus leaving too little room for administrative discretion. The most fervent critic of rights talk, Mary Ann Glendon, gives many examples of the way in which an overemphasis on rights and on the protective function may lead to excesses. If, on the basis of policy arguments, we regulate in such a way that the resulting rules provide rights for individual citizens, this may block the necessary flexibility in public administration. In order to have responsible policies, the government should be able to adapt its rules and policies in a flexible and creative way. If the protective function enters too far into the sphere of instrumental legislation, this may lead to unworkable situations. It seems to me that,

49 ML, p. 18, argues convincingly for a nontrivial interpretation of the notion of balance, as something which is necessary if we recognize that a plurality of ends is legitimate.

in the Netherlands, the very strong legal protection which workers and, especially, government employees used to have, has in some situations (for example at universities) been the cause of insufficient flexibility. Here the protective function of workers' rights has sometimes frustrated highly desirable policy changes.

It is not only an issue of a balance of functions or of rights-based regulations versus policy-based regulations; it is also a matter of legal attitude. Connected with an emphasis on the protective function of law is an adversarial, conflict-oriented attitude and even, in its extreme form, an antigovernment attitude, which might be detrimental to policies oriented toward the common good. The reverse is connected with an emphasis on public policies: an attitude which too easily neglects legitimate differences and legitimate claims of individuals and minorities with an appeal to communal interest.

2. There should be a balance between the communicative and the regulatory functions.50 I think that here Fuller offers us important inspiration with the two moralities and the image of the pointer. In contemporary Western societies, there is no need to warn against too little regulation; overregulation is the more common vice.

Here again, it is not only a balance between different functions, or between different types of law, it is also a matter of attitude. The communicative function of law requires a different attitude both in legislators and in the public. It requires a stronger interactional approach to legislation. If we treat ideals, principles, or policies as rules, we reduce their guidance and critical potential and stifle creativity in practice.

One last remark on the importance of the communicative function of law. I would suggest that, owing to developments in recent times, this function is becoming more important. In traditional, relatively simple societies, regulation is the standard form of law, and may suffice to guarantee a well-ordered society. But in our complex and strongly pluralist society, in which the state must place its trust in the autonomous action of highly educated citizens, mere regulation is no longer sufficiently effective. A more interactional perspective on law and its communicative function may help us to solve part of the problems. In fact, such a communicative approach is central to various alternatives

50 Cf. ML, p. 29: "A pervasive problem of social design is therefore that of maintaining a balance between supporting structure and adaptive fluidity."
to traditional regulatory law that have been suggested in the last decades, like responsive or reflexive law. This suggests that Fuller is now even more topical than he may have been when he wrote *The Morality of Law*.